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Introduction 
There has been much debate recently about the future of federalism in Australia.1  One of the key issues 
in any federal system is the allocation of responsibilities over business activity, or trade and commerce.  
Of course, s51(1) of the Constitution allows the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to trade and 
commerce among the states and overseas.  In the past, this power has been interpreted quite narrowly,2 
with a corresponding reduction in the ability for the Commonwealth to regulate business.  This difficulty 
was in the past compounded by an interpretation given to s92 which created difficulties for both Federal 
and State Governments in their attempts to regulate business.3  The High Court has not followed the 
same path as has its American equivalent in interpreting the clause on which s51(1) was based.  This 
paper will summarise the position in both Australia and the United States in terms of the federal 
government’s commerce power, before arguing that the interpretation given to the Australian version 
should be broader than considered by a majority of the High Court in the past, and closer to the 
American interpretation.   
 
There is a view that, following the Commonwealth’s victory in New South Wales v Commonwealth,4 
there is no necessity in order that the Commonwealth can ‘properly’ regulate business and commercial 
activity in Australia that the reach of s51(1) be widened.  On that view, the High Court has given the 
Commonwealth the keys to significant expansion of business regulation, provided it can base the 
legislation on something to do with a corporation.  On one view, this should be quite straightforward, 
given that 85-90% of non-farm labour in Australia is employed by corporations.5  Clearly, much 
commerce in Australia relates to corporations.  However, it will be argued that there remains a need for 
the Commonwealth to be given a broader power over trade and commerce – clearly not every business 
or thing related to, or affecting, business occurs through a corporation.  As will be seen, a wider 
interpretation of trade and commerce may allow the Commonwealth to do directly what presently it 
must pursue indirectly, for example through the use of tied s96 grants.  Despite the introduction of the 
GST, specific purpose grants remain a very significant feature of Australia’s federal system.6  The 
author’s argument is that if the s51(1) power were interpreted more broadly, there would be less need for 
the Commonwealth to resort to a s96 grant to control an area, with the associated blurring of 
responsibilities and accountabilities which can follow.7   
                                                 
1 See for example the Business Council of Australia’s Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal-State 
Relations (2006) and Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems, Access Economics The Costs of Federalism (2006), 
and Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers Federalist Paper 1: Australia’s Federal Future (Report for the Council for the 
Australian Federation)(2007) 
2 Eg Beal v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1966) 114 CLR 283; Wragg v New South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 353; Attorney-
General (WA)(ex rel Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian National Airlines Commission (1976) 138 
CLR 492 
3 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497; North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of 
New South Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559; Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 1)(1954) 93 CLR 1; cf Cole v 
Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 
4 (2006) 81 ALJR 34; the joint reasons considered the main cases involving the corporations power, expressing their 
agreement with the broad view of Gaudron J in Re Pacific Coal Ltd  that the power extended to regulation of the activities, 
functions, relationships and business of the corporation, including the creation of rights and privileges of a corporation, the 
imposition of obligations on it, the regulation of the conduct of those through whom it acts, its employees and shareholders, 
as well as the regulation of those whose conduct is or is capable of affecting its activities, functions, relationships or business.   
5 Peter Reith, then Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Breaking the Gridlock: Towards a 
Simpler National Workplace Relations System – Discussion Paper 1: The Case for Change (2000) 
6 Despite all GST revenues (which are growing sharply) going to the States pursuant to the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations, specific purpose grants to the States under s96 remain substantial, 
with payments either to or through the States totalling almost $27 billion in the 2006-2007 year, an increase from about $25.5 
billion in the 2005-2006 year.  This is more than 25% of States’ expenditure. 
7 Eg Cheryl Saunders ‘Fiscal Federalism – A General and Unholy Scramble’ in Greg Craven ed Australian Federalism – 
Towards the Second Century (1992) pp120-121;  Walsh, C ‘Vertical Fiscal Imbalance – The Issues’ in Collins, D J ed 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and the Allocation of Taxing Powers Australian Tax Research Foundation Conference Series No13 
p41, Walsh, C ‘Federal Reform and the Politics of VFI’ (1992) 27 Australian Journal of Political Science (Special Issue) 
A narrow view of the trade and commerce power (and for a time the corporations power)8 has not 
allowed the Commonwealth’s control over business transactions to increase, even as changes in society 
and the way business has been conducted have demanded it.  As a result, desirable uniformity in other 
areas of business regulation has had to occur through other, indirect and frequently tortuous means given 
the need to obtain consent of sometimes hostile state governments, who often squabble among 
themselves and who do not generally have a proud record of agreement on legal reform.  These have 
included (eventual) referrals of power,9 or the eventual passage of mirror legislation.10   
 
The article will firstly briefly outline the past approach that has been taken to interpretation of s51(1); 
then I examine commerce clause jurisprudence from the United States with a view to suggesting how a 
broader interpretation of the Australian head of power might be justified (and needed).  I conclude with 
particular areas of responsibility over which the Commonwealth might then take control, making a 
business case also for such a development. 
 
Past Interpretation of s51(1) Power 
It is fair to say that the Commonwealth’s power with respect to trade and commerce among the States 
and with other countries has been interpreted narrowly in the past by the High Court.  This has occurred 
via two main means; (a) a narrow conception of what is encompassed by trade and commerce; and (b) an 
insistence on a strict division between interstate and overseas trade and commerce on the one hand 
(hereafter ‘constitutional trade and commerce’, and intrastate trade and commerce (hereafter non-
constitutional trade and commerce) on the other. 
 
(a) narrow conception of what is meant by trade and commerce 
The High Court has expressed the view that the concept of trade and commerce is not a term of art but a 
commercial term, and includes all the commercial arrangements of which transportation is the direct and 
necessary result; including mutual communings, negotiations, the bargain, transport and delivery.11  It 
includes financial transactions.12  By virtue of the power, the Federal Government itself can participate 
in trade and commerce.13  There is an incidental aspect to the power, allowing the Commonwealth to 
regulate peripheral matters, consistent with the interstate/intrastate distinction.14  It can include the 
absolute prohibition of trade and it doesn’t matter that the law also concerns other topics.15
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
pp24-26; Walsh, C ‘State Taxation and VFI: Radical Reform Options’ in Issues in State Taxation (1990) p63, Working Party 
on Tax Powers (1991) ‘Taxation and the Fiscal Imbalance Between Different Levels  of Australian Government 
Responsibility, Accountability and Efficiency’, Access Economics An Access Economics Study on the Distribution of 
Federal/State Financial Powers (1995), Howard, C The Federal Fiscal Imbalance Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations (1984), and Access Economics The Costs of Federalism (2006) p33-37 
 
8 Originally, the Commonwealth was not thought to be competent under its corporations power to regulate anti-competitive 
practices of trading corporations:  Huddart Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; eventually this was 
overruled in Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468. 
9 This came eventually, after past successful constitutional challenges to national corporate regulation:  State of New South 
Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482; see now the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and Australian Securities Investment 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
10 Prior to harmonisation of credit laws, there existed ‘different forms of credit, penalties, notification requirements and 
liabilities, which led to inconsistencies across State and Territory boundaries … harmonisation was required’:  Vermeesch 
and Lindgren Business Law of Australia (2005) 11th ed, p745-746.  Each State has now adopted the Consumer Credit Code 
which appears as an appendix in the Consumer Credit (Queensland) Act 1994. 
11 W and A McArthur Ltd v Queensland (1920) 28 CLR 530, 546-547 (Knox CJ, Isaacs and Starke JJ); some of the earlier 
cases are discussed in Jim Herlihy ‘Constitutional Restraints on Trade and Commerce in Australia and Canada’ (1976) 9 
University of Queensland Law Journal 188 
12 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 
13 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 
14 R v Foster; Ex Parte Eastern and Australian Steamship Co Ltd (1959) 103 CLR 256 (Commonwealth regulating the 
employment conditions of workers involved in interstate trade and commerce); see further on this issue David McCann ‘First 
Head Revisited: A Single Industrial Relations System under the Trade and Commerce Power’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 
75 
15 Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1, 22 (Mason J) 
However, the High Court has generally not allowed the Commonwealth to regulate production or 
manufacture, pursuant to the s51(1) power.  In Beal v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd,16 the Court 
insisted that production was not part of s51(1): 
 
There is the clearest break between the manufacture and the inter-state movement by means of which the manufactured 
margarine is got to the proper place for delivery to the buyer in fulfilment of the contract, and the break is such that to treat 
the steps in manufacture and the interstate movement as one continuous piece of trade is artificial and unreal … Even where a 
specific batch of material can be identified in the factory as being in course of manufacture for the specific purpose of being 
applied to fulfilment of a specific contract with a buyer in another state, it is not logically possible to affirm that any trade in 
respect of that material or any interstate movement has begun17
 
A slightly broader approach was evident in O’Sullivan v Noarlunga Meats Ltd,18 where Fullagar J 
concluded that regulations prescribing conditions in slaughterhouses were a valid exercise of s51(1),  
 
Even if counsel for the State of South Australia be right in saying that the course of commerce with other countries does not 
begin until a later stage … the objectives for which the power is conferred may be impossible of achievement by means of a 
mere prescription of standards for export and the institution of a system of inspection at the point of export.  It may very 
reasonably be thought necessary to go further back, and even to enter the factory or the field or the mine.19  
 
Fullagar J justified his broader reading by referring to American authorities on the commerce clause, 
noting that while in the past production had been excluded from its reach, the American Supreme Court 
had broadened its view.20
 
(b) rejection of commingling doctrine 
Perhaps the most pressing issue for any adjudicative body called on to interpret a power confined to 
interstate and overseas trade and commerce is to decide what to do about a law that impacts this kind of 
commerce, as well as other kinds of commerce.  Is it only valid in its application to the interstate and 
overseas part?  Is it completely valid?  What happens if the ‘constitutional’ and ‘non-constitutional’ 
trade and commerce are integrated, physically and/or economically?  What if the non-constitutional 
commerce ‘affects’ or may affect the constitutional trade and commerce in one way or another? 
 
The High Court has traditionally insisted that the distinction be maintained.  As Dixon CJ put it in 
Wragg v State of New South Wales,21  
 
The distinction which is drawn between inter-state trade and the domestic trade of a State for the purpose of the power 
conferred upon the Parliament by s51(1) to make laws with respect to trade and commerce with other countries and among 
the states may well be considered artificial and unsuitable to modern times.  But it is a distinction adopted by the Constitution 
and it must be observed, however much interdependence may now exist between the two divisions of trade and commerce 
which the Constitution thus distinguishes … even in the application of the (incidental power) the distinction which the 
Constitution makes between the two branches of trade and commerce must be maintained.  Its existence makes impossible 
any operation of the incidental power which would obliterate the distinction22
                                                 
16 (1966) 114 CLR 283 
17 Kitto J, 304; to like effect Menzies J ‘to manufacture is not, of itself, to trade’ (306); refer also to Grannall v Marrickville 
Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55, 72 ‘the complaint of the defendant company remains a complaint against a restriction 
upon the production of table margarine, not against a restriction on inter-state trade’ (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto 
JJ) 
18 (1954) 92 CLR 565 
19 597-598 
20 Quoting cases such as National Labour Relations Board v Laughlin Steel Corporation (1936) 301 US 1; United States v 
Darby (1941) 312 US 100; and McCullough v Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316.  In Mandeville Island Farms Inc v American 
Crystal Sugar Co (1948) 334 US 219, the United States Supreme Court was emphatic that ‘the artificial and mechanical 
separation of ‘production’ and ‘manufacturing’ from ‘commerce’, without regard to their economic continuity, the effects of 
the former two upon the latter, and the varying methods by which the several processes are organised, related and carried on 
in different industries or indeed within a single industry, no longer suffices to put either production or manufacturing and 
refining processes beyond reach of Congress authority’ (229). 
21 (1953) 88 CLR 353, 385-386 
22 Refer for similar comments to R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 628-629 (Latham CJ), 672 (Dixon J), Evatt 
and McTiernan JJ (677); Swift Australian Co Pty Ltd v Boyd Parkinson (1962) 108 CLR 189, 203 (McTiernan J), Kitto J 
 
Kitto J in Airlines (No 2),23 referring to American precedent on the commerce clause accepting that 
Congress might be able to regulate constitutional and non-constitutional trade and commerce where it 
was commingled, rejected these developments for Australian law: 
 
The Australian union is one of dual federalism, and until the Parliament and the people see fit to change it, a true federation it 
must remain.  This Court is entrusted with the preservation of constitutional distinctions, and it both fails in its task and 
exceeds its authority if it discards them, however out of touch with practical conceptions or with modern conditions they may 
appear to be in some or all of their applications.  To import the doctrine of the American cases into the law of the Australian 
Constitution would in my opinion be an error.24
 
However, in that case the High Court went on to conclude that where there was physical integration such 
that regulation of constitutional trade and commerce could not be effective without also regulating non-
constitutional trade and commerce, the Commonwealth could regulate the entirety.  As Menzies J put it, 
‘if control of intra-State trade is necessary to make effectual the exercise of Commonwealth power, that 
control may be exercised by the Commonwealth regardless of the control exercised by a State’.25  To 
like effect was the High Court’s verdict in Redfern v Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd,26 a restraint of trade 
case involving three companies, two of which were national and had one factory in Victoria, and the 
other wholly Victorian based.  The plaintiff, a Victorian company, alleged that the others were involved 
in anti-competitive agreements to not supply them.  The High Court found that the agreements, 
involving both interstate and intrastate trade, were regulatable under s51(1); this was because the two 
were ‘inseparably connected’.  The court found the Commonwealth could prohibit or regulate acts which 
relate to intra-state trade if they relate to constitutional trade.27
 
By majority, the Court has in the past maintained a distinction between physical and economic necessity 
in assessing the Commonwealth’s claims to be able to regulate both constitutional and non-constitutional 
trade and commerce.  While the former was acceptable reasoning to the court in Airlines (No 2), the fact 
that an intra-state journey may economically be required in order that an interstate service run has not 
been sufficient to allow the Commonwealth to regulate the entirety.  This was the view of the majority in 
the Ansett case.28 However, Mason and Murphy JJ dissented from this position.  Mason J concluded that 
 
The notion of what is reasonably necessary to the fulfilment of the legislative power cannot be confined to that which is 
physical, excluding all that which is economic.  No distinction can or should be drawn between what is physically necessary 
and what is economically necessary … the inquiry, if it is to have any practical reality, must have regard to the volume of 
traffic likely to be available and the economics of operation.  In this sense the physical and economic considerations are both 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(208), Taylor J (212), Windeyer J (224); Attorney-General (WA) ex rel Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v 
Australian National Airlines Commission (1975) 138 CLR 492, 502-503 (Gibbs J), 509 (Stephen J) 
23 Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2)(1965) 113 CLR 54, 115; although Windeyer J in the same case said that 
the strict approach to the differentiation of constitutional and non-constitutional commerce ‘has been criticised, and perhaps 
justly in some cases, as a legalistic concept inharmonious today with economic realities’ (149) 
24 Cf Lino Graglia ‘United States v Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause’ (1996) 74 Texas Law Review 719, 
722 who argues that the Constitution (US, but submitted to be equally applicable locally) does not provide for divided 
sovereignty, and the Constitution provides that in the event of conflict between central and regional law, Congress must 
prevail.  He concludes that ‘the only practical basis for the continuance of a degree of local autonomy is the forbearance of 
the central government’ (723); and Leanne Wilson (again in the United States context) who in ‘The Fate of the Dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and Crosby’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 746, 785 who concludes that 
‘dual federalism, however, is no longer accepted as a valid form of federal-state structure … the assumptions that underlie the 
dual federalism justification are invalid’; Edward Corwin ‘The Passing of Dual Federalism’ (1950) 36 Virginia Law Review.   
1; Stephen Gardbaum ‘New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States’ (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law 
Review 483;  Justice O’Connor (dissenting) recently used dual sovereignty reasoning in Gonzalez v Raich (2005) 125 S Ct 
2195 
25 143; see to like effect Barwick CJ (78), Kitto J (117), Taylor J (127), Windeyer J (151), Owen J (166) 
26 (1964) 110 CLR 194 
27 Taylor J, 221.  In Swift, McTiernan and Owen JJ thought the Commonwealth could exclusively regulate the conditions in 
slaughterhouses, even though some of the animals slaughtered were not constitutional commerce:  220, 227 
28 Attorney-General of the State of Western Australia (ex rel Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd) v Australian 
National Airways Commission (1975) 138 CLR 492 
relevant and indispensable elements to be taken into account in assessing what is reasonably necessary for the particular end 
in view29
 
Murphy J noted that s51(1) did not make constitutional and non-constitutional trade and commerce 
mutually exclusive; the Constitution did not give the States exclusive power over intrastate trade and 
commerce.  He found the insistence on the division and the refusal to allow the incidental power to 
extend into intrastate trade and commerce as ‘keep(ing) the pre-Engineers ghosts walking, minimising 
the trade and commerce power and inhibit(ing) its use’.30  Refusal to take into account commercial 
considerations when interpreting the trade and commerce power was illogical; no-one would suggest 
that in interpreting the defence power, defence considerations were irrelevant.  The Constitution 
contained no express delineation between physical and economic necessity. 
 
Commerce Clause in the United States 
The lengthy United States jurisprudence on that country’s commerce clause will now be considered.  
Despite the express refusal of some members of the High Court to consider the commerce clause 
interpretation in terms of their s51(1) deliberations,31 it is submitted that this jurisprudence is directly 
relevant.  Of course, the Founding Fathers were influenced by the United States Constitution as a model 
constitution for a federal system, and incorporated many of its features.  In relation to trade and 
commerce, s51(1) was based on the United States commerce clause.32  The United States version was 
copied to a large extent by the Founding Fathers.33  The need to advance inter-regional trade was one of 
the main reasons for both countries creating a central government.34  In fundamental respects, our 
constitutional principles are similar, from the acceptance of judicial review,35 to the appropriate means 
of characterising a law as being within power.  As Marshall CJ said famously in McCullough v 
Maryland36  
 
                                                 
29 523; refer also to Sir Anthony Mason ‘The Australian Constitution 1901-1988’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 752, 
755-756 
30 530; Sir Leslie Zines would agree with Murphy J, dismissing the idea of a distinction between economic and physical 
effects as ‘lacking in logic unless one adopts a doctrine of reserved powers’:  The High Court and the Constitution (1997) 
p77.  See also Peter Hanks ‘The Political Dimension of Constitutional Adjudication’ (1987) 10 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 141, 145-148 
31 Most famously Kitto J in Airlines (No 2) Pty Ltd (115); see also in that case Barwick CJ (77), Menzies J (144), Windeyer J 
(149); Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55, 77 (Dixon CJ McTiernan Webb and Kitto J); Swift 
Australia Co Pty Ltd v Boyd Parkinson (1962) 108 CLR 189, 203 (McTiernan); Redfern v Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd 
(1965) 110 CLR 194, 220 (Menzies J); Ansett (1976) 138 CLR 492, 502-503 (Gibbs J); Australian Coastal Shipping 
Commission v O’Reilly (1962) 107 CLR 46, 66 (Menzies J); R v Foster; Ex Parte Eastern and Australian Steamship Co Ltd 
(1959) 103 CLR 256, 310 (Windeyer J) 
32 As George Winterton, HP Lee, Arthur Glass and James Thomson say in Australian Federal Constitutional Law: 
Commentary and Materials (2007), the words in the United States Commerce Clause ‘closely parallel those of s51(1) of the 
Australian Constitution, so interpretations of the American commerce clause have obvious relevance for Australia’ (p172).  
Zines, to like effect, mentions the ‘United States provision, from which the Australian position was largely taken’: The High 
Court and the Constitution (1997) p55 
33 Federation Debates (Official Record)(Sydney, 3/4/1891), p662-665; Ansett per Murphy J (529)    
34 As the Supreme Court noted in Gibbons v Ogden (1824) 22 US 1, 224 the ability of the States to lay tariffs on the goods of 
other States produced a conflict of commercial regulations destructive of unity among the States, and undermined the 
confederation; refer also to The Federalist No 6 at xv (Hamilton).  As Marshall CJ wrote in Brown v Maryland (1827) 25 US 
419, 446: ‘It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the federal government , contributed 
more to that great (constitutional) revolution which introduced the modern (constitutional) system, than the deep and general 
conviction, that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress’.   In the Australian context, Sir John Cockburn noted that 
‘absolute freedom of trade is the goal towards which federal efforts of the past ten years have been chiefly directed … the 
dominant motive has been the promptings of utility towards removal of the border customs houses and the desire to attain that 
commercial and industrial expansion which must ensue from the removal of artificial limitations’ (Australian Federation 
1901, p14); John Quick and Robert Garran Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901) p83 (they quote 
an 1849 Privy Council Committee Report commenting on the ‘evil obstruction of intercolonial trade’; Michael Coper 
Encounters With the Australian Constitution (1987) p58.  
35 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 and Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 
492 and 513, citing Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137  
36 (1819) 4 Wheat 316, 421; this quote was recently expressly approved of by Gummow and Crennan JJ in Thomas v 
Mowbray [2007] HCA 33, para 102 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, what are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution are constitutional 
 
These words have been expressly adopted by the High Court as the correct means of interpreting the 
heads of power given to the Commonwealth by the Australian Constitution.37  They were made in the 
specific context of the Commerce Clause.  Both countries have dealt with the difficulties caused by State 
regulation which discriminates against interstate trade.38  Of course, there are differences between the 
Australian and the American versions.39  However, for the reasons given, it is submitted to be legitimate 
to refer in some detail to the United States case law and commentary on the Commerce Clause, in 
considering the Australian equivalent.40  It will be no surprise that the American courts have grappled 
with many of the isuses mentioned in my discussion of the Australian authorities in this area. 
 
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause41
The classic early statement of Congress’ power over commerce appears in the judgment of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden,42 where he said Congress could act 
 
To all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those 
which are completely within a particular state; which do not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, 
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the (Federal) Government 
 
The focus on whether the legislation was conducive to a trade and commerce purpose43 is evident in 
decisions upholding legislation removing barriers to the use of a river for interstate commerce,44 
                                                 
37 Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55, 76 (what we now call the ‘reasonably appropriate and 
adapted test’). 
38 In Australia, this is through s92, which has been interpreted to prohibit protectionist laws which discriminate against 
interstate trade and commerce:  Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360.  In the United States, this has occurred indirectly, 
through the development of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence prima facie denying States the ability to discriminate 
against interstate commerce:  Welton v Missouri (1875) 91 US 275; Oregon Waste Systems Inc v Department of 
Environmental Quality (1994) 511 US 93; Granholm v Heald (2005) 125 S Ct 1885; refer for more on the dormant commerce 
clause to Leanne Wilson ‘The Fate of the Dominant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and Grosby’ (2007) 107 
Columbia Law Review 746; Norman Williams ‘Why Congress May Not Overrule the Dominant Commerce Clause’ (2006) 
53 University of California Law Review 153; Andrew Thompson ‘Public Health, Environmental Protection and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Sovereignty in the Federalist Structure’ (2005) 55 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
213 
39 The Australian words are broader, in allowing laws ‘with respect to’ not merely those ‘regulating’ trade and commerce.  It 
is true that there are more specific heads of power available to the Federal Government in Australia, meaning that 
government in Australia is less reliant on its commerce powers than its American equivalent.  It is also true that there is no 
equivalent to s92 in the United States Constitution.  Murphy J believed that one of the reasons the High Court had interpreted 
trade and commerce narrowly in Australia was its concern for the impact on the interpretation of s92: Ansett p529.  One of 
the reasons given for interpreting the United States Commerce Clause broadly has been to encourage free trade between 
states, and to avoid the kinds of protectionist problems that plagued the confederation (see for example Justice Harlan in Guy 
v Baltimore (1879) 100 US 434, 440-442.  This objective has also been met through the development of the dormant 
commerce clause (see n34):  Granholm v Heald (2005) 125 S Ct 1885, 1896.  This reasoning does not apply to the 
interpretation of s51(1), given that s92 already prevents discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind (although clearly both 
sections concern ‘trade and commerce’ and those words must be read consistently).  The Australian commerce clause 
includes the word ‘trade’ while the United States clause does not.  The United States Supreme Court has shown a greater 
willingness to defer to the ‘rational basis’ for Congress’ reliance on the Commerce Clause (National Labor Relations Board v 
Jones and Laughlin (1937) 301 US 1); while the Australian High Court will not allow the Commonwealth to ‘recite itself into 
power’:  Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1; Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33 
40 Recently in Re Maritime Union of Australia; ex parte CSL Pacific Shipping Inc (2003) HCA 43, the High Court referred 
approvingly to United States commerce clause decisions as allowing something relating to constitutional commerce to be 
regulated. 
41 There is an extensive literature, including Richard Friedman ‘The Sometimes Bumpy Stream of Commerce Clause 
Doctrine’ (2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 981; Barry Cushman ‘Continuing and Change in Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence’ (2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 1009; ‘Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence’ (2000) 
67 University of Chicago Law Review 1089; Grant Nelson and Robert Pushaw ‘Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying 
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But Preserve State Control Over Social Issues’ (1999) 85 Iowa 
Law Review 1; Jesse Choper ‘Taming Congress’ Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?’ 
(2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 731; Ronald Rotunda ‘The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: An 
Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?’ (2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 795 
42 (1824) 22 US 1 
legislation creating a bank,45 and regulations making interstate trade and commerce (as well as other 
trade and commerce) safer.46  Congress’ removal of a State-introduced financial advantage given to 
intrastate commerce over interstate commerce was also validated in the Shreveport Rates Cases:47
 
Congressional power … embraces the right to control (interstate carriers’ operations) in all matters having such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency 
of the interstate service (emphasis added), and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be 
conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance. 
 
The above quote endorses the ‘effects’ test from Ogden.  There is some use of such a test in Australian 
jurisprudence on the commerce clause.48  However, contrary to the findings of the High Court in Ansett, 
the above quote from the American case notes the importance of economic arguments in assessing the 
Federal Government’s power to regulate intrastate commerce.  The State law had the effect of providing 
an economic advantage to intrastate trade, and an economic penalty to interstate trade.  Congress could 
counteract this. 
 
For many years, however, the Supreme Court insisted, as the Australian courts have insisted, that 
production or manufacture was not part of commerce.  This was to preserve the position of the States.49 
Legislation seeking to deal with anti-competitive practices relating to sugar refineries,50 and legislation 
prohibiting the shipment of goods produced contrary to child labour laws was struck down based on this 
principle.51  Some saw these cases as a product of their times, when laissez-faire economics was in 
vogue and regulation of the market frowned upon.52  Arguments that legislation which affected 
production also indirectly affected commerce did not initially succeed,53 because the Court required that 
the effect on commerce had to be direct.54  The direct/indirect distinction was a means to limit Congress 
power over commerce, and reserve an area of legislative responsibility for the states.55   
                                                                                                                                                                         
43 The Canadian courts, although their view of the federal government’s trade powers has been more limited than in the 
United States, will also consider whether the purpose of the law is inter-provincial:  Citizens Insurance of Canada v Parsons 
(1881) 7 App Cas 96; General Motors of Canada Ltd v City Nationwide Leasing 1 S.C.R. 641; Greg Taylor ‘The Commerce 
Clause – Commonwealth Comparisons’ (2001) 24 Boston Comparative International and Comparative Law Review 235 
44 The Daniel Ball (1871) 77 US 557 
45 McCullough v Maryland (1819) 17 US 316 
46 Southern Railway Co v United States (1911) 222 US 20 
47 (1914) 234 US 342 
48 In O’Sullivan v Noarlunga Meats (1954) 92 CLR 565, Fullagar J concluded that by virtue of the overseas trade and 
commerce aspect of s51(1), ‘all matters which may affect (emphasis added) beneficially or adversely the export trade of 
Australia … must be the legitimate concern of the Commonwealth’ (597). 
49 For example in Kidd v Pearson (1888) 128 US 1, 21 ‘if it be held that the term commerce includes the regulation of all 
such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that if 
would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same thing.  The result would be that Congress would be 
invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate … every branch of human activity … a situation more 
paralysing of the state governments, and more provocative of conflicts between the general government and the States … 
would be difficult to imagine’ 
50 United States v E C Knight Co (1895) 156 US 1; cf Swift and Co v United States (1905) 196 US 375, where the Sherman 
Act’s application to wholly intrastate agreements was upheld on the basis that they affected interstate commerce. 
51 Hammer v Dagenhart (1918) 247 US 251 
52 Eg Justice Souter in United States v Morrison (2000) 529 US 598, 644 
53 Carter v Carter Coal Co (1936) 298 US 238.  For example, the law invalidated in E C Knight proscribed monopolies over 
manufacture, which could not be regulated by Congress because the effect on later trade was indirect and incidental only.  
The result is described by one author as an example of ‘dual federalism’ that the Court was right in later cases to reject:  
Donald Regan ‘How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power And Incidentally Rewrite United States v Lopez (1996) 94 
Michigan Law Review 554 
54 Diamond Glue Co v United States Glue Co (1903) 187 US 611; Superior Oil Co v Mississippi (1929) 280 US 390 
55 On this basis, Congress could not require increased wages for employees of a poultry slaughterhouse; although most of the 
poultry came from interstate, the commerce ‘stream’ had come to an end.  The effect of the law on interstate commerce was 
found to be indirect and insufficient:  Schechter Poultry Corp v United States (1935) 295 US 495.  Graglia dismisses the 
direct/indirect distinction as a ‘standard approach to the problem of confining the scope of a rule that threatens to be all 
embracing – proves in practice to be almost entirely subjective’:  Lino Graglia ‘United States v Lopez: Judicial Review Under 
the Commerce Clause’ (1996) 74 Texas Law Review 719, 731.  Readers may draw parallels with the High Court’s past use of 
the direct/indirect distinction in interpreting the s92 freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse section, for example in 
 
A different view was taken in Stafford v Wallace, where legislation concerning production of livestock 
was held valid under the commerce clause.  As Chief Justice Taft said, 
 
The object to be secured by the Act is the free and unburdened flow of livestock from the ranges and farms of the West and 
Southwest through the great stockyards and slaughtering centres on the borders of that region; and thence in the form of meat 
products to the consuming cities of the country in the Middle West and East.56
 
These arguments were also accepted in National Labour Relations Board v Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Corp,57 where legislation which sought to regulate work activity of workers engaged in intrastate trade 
in a steel company operating nationally was validated by the Supreme Court.  The Court found that  
 
Constitutional commerce extends to all those activities that have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce 
that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.58
 
As well as abandoning the direct/indirect test,59 the court overturned the past distinction between 
commerce and manufacture/production.  The limit of the court’s power of judicial review was to 
consider whether there was a rational basis for the view of Congress that the thing being regulated 
affected interstate commerce.  It was not for the court to substitute its view of the merits of the law, or to 
seek to achieve other ends by invalidating such legislation.  Links have been made between these legal 
developments and changes in the United States.60
 
Congress was then found to be able to regulate minimum wages of a largely intrastate manufacturer, 
because otherwise interstate commerce competition might be harmed by differential wages in different 
states.61  It could even regulate hours and wages of employees of schools and hospitals, because these 
institutions made purchases from other states.62  Congress could regulate the use of land for production, 
because it affected commerce.63  An exercise of the commerce power could, like in Australia, include 
the prohibition of an activity.64
 
The Court accepted the principle of aggregation, so that it could look at the general impact of the 
particular conduct on interstate commerce if it were allowed; rather than the impact of the particular 
conduct of the person who was challenging the law.  In this way, Congress was able to regulate wheat 
consumed by a farmer on the farm under the commerce power – because these acts of private 
consumption had the ability to affect wheat prices generally.65  Similarly, if discrimination were allowed 
in restaurants,66 or in motels,67 it might affect interstate commerce in relation to employees travelling 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497; Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 
55; Wragg v New South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 353 
56 (1922) 258 US 495, 514-516 
57 (1937) 301 US 1; see also Stafford v Wallace (1922) 258 US 495 
58 37 
59 Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 124-125 
60 For example, Joseph Kallenbach in Federal Cooperation with the States Under the Commerce Clause (1968) notes that 
‘powerful economic forces … industrialisation and improvement in transportation facilities, with an accompanying extension 
of trade horizons, demanded the freedom from state regulation of commerce .. the effect was to cause the grant of power to be 
interpreted as generally exclusive by the Supreme Court’ (31); and Barry Cushman ‘Formalism and Realism in Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence’ (2000) 67 University of Chicago Law Review 1089, 1101: ‘as the national economy became 
increasingly integrated in the years following the Civil War, the Court began a conscious and increasingly aggressive 
campaign to break down local barriers to interstate trade through a ‘free-trade’ construction of the dormant Commerce 
Clause’. 
61 United States v Darby (1941) 312 US 100 
62 Maryland v Wirtz (1968) 392 US 183; however a challenge to such regulation on the ground that it breached principles of 
intergovernmental immunity was successful in National League of Cities v Usery (1976) 426 US 833, though this case was 
itself overruled in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) 469 US 528; refer also to New York v United 
States (1992) 505 US 144 
63 Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association (1981) 452 US 264 
64 Champion v Ames (1903) 188 US 321; similar to Murphyores v Cth (1976) 136 CLR 1 
65 Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111 
66 Katzenbach v McClung (1964) 379 US 294 
from one state to another, or travellers generally.  Congress could also regulate extortionate credit 
transactions, because loan sharking could lead to organised crime across state lines.68   
 
Some recent cases have indicated the outer limits of the ‘affect’ or ‘substantial effect’ test, though it 
should be noted that the decisions also strongly re-affirm the test.69  In United States v Lopez,70 
Congress had passed a law criminalising gun possession within a school zone.  By a majority of 5-4,71 
the Supreme Court held the commerce power did not support the legislation.  The act did not regulate a 
commercial activity; there was no demonstrable link between guns and interstate commerce.72  
Floodgates arguments appealed to the majority: 
 
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law, 
for example.  Under these theories, it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal 
law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the Government’s 
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate 
 
The Court identified three broad categories of constitutional use of the commerce power: 
(a) Congress could regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 
(b) Congress could regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, although the threat may come only from intrastate activity; and 
(c) Congress could regulate those activities with a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 
 
The dissentients argued that gun possession could impose costs, increasing insurance (which was 
commerce) costs.  Violent crime could lessen interstate movement of citizens; it might impede 
education, thereby affecting commerce. 
 
Similar issues arose for an identical Supreme Court in United States v Morrison, involving the 
constitutionality of a law conferring a civil remedy on the victim of domestic violence.  Also by 5-4, and 
for similar reasons as the Lopez decision, the Court invalidated the legislation.  The majority confined 
commerce clause regulation to economic activity, and gender motivated violence was not economic 
activity.  Although Congress in this case had attempted to justify its use of the commerce power,73 this 
did not make unconstitutional laws somehow valid.  Four controlling factors were mentioned as being 
relevant to the substantial affect test: 
 
(a) whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of economic enterprise; 
(b) whether the statute contains any express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a 
discrete set of cases; 
(c) whether the statute or its history contains express congressional findings that the regulated 
activity affects interstate commerce; and 
(d) whether the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is 
attenuated.74 
                                                                                                                                                                         
67 Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc v United States (1964) 379 US 241 
68 Perez v United States (1971) 402 US 146 
69 Only Justice Thomas would reject the continuing applicability of the test. 
70 (1995) 514 US 549; refer to Jeremy Philips ‘United States v Lopez: Constitutional Interpretation in the United States and 
Australia’ (1995) 18(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 532; Donald Regan ‘How to Think About the Federal 
Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v Lopez’ (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review 554; Jefferson Powell 
‘Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends’ (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review 651; Anna Cramer ‘The Right Results for All the 
Wrong Reasons: An Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause’ (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 271 
71 Rehnquist CJ, together with Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas; Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and 
Ginsburg dissenting 
72 Later, the legislation was re-drafted to confine its operation to guns that had crossed a state border; this legislation was 
upheld in United States v Danks 221 F 3d 1037 (8th Cir); cert den (2000) 528 US 1091 
73 It argued that gender-motivated violence affected interstate commerce by deterring potential victims from travelling 
interstate, from engaging in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate 
commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the 
demand for interstate products. 
74 612 
 
In dissent, Justice Souter claimed the majority’s new test was inconsistent with past cases such as 
Wickard and Hodel, which were not based on ‘economic activity’.  Viewing earlier cases limiting the 
commerce clause as being based on now-discredited laissez faire economics, he compared the restriction 
posed by the majority in Lopez and Morrison 
 
Just as the old formalism had value in the service of an economic conception (laissez faire), the new one is useful in serving a 
conception of federalism.  It is the instrument by which assertions of national power are to be limited in favour of preserving 
a supposedly discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual states see 
fit75
 
Breyer J dismissed the supposed distinction between economic activity and non-economic activity as 
random, creating fine distinctions which did little to further the federalist interests that called it into 
being in the first place.76  The minority was willing to defer to the judgment of Congress as to the need 
for the law, and that there was a reasonable basis for linking it with constitutional commerce.   
 
We see then a progressive move away from restrictions on Congress’ commerce clause.  The American 
courts have had to consider many of the issues that the Australian High Court has had to consider, and 
there is some alignment in views.  However, the United States Supreme Court has shown a greater 
willingness to defer to Congress’ assessment of what is required; and accorded it a very broad power to 
regulate any activities which might in the judgment of Congress ‘affect’ interstate trade and commerce.  
Recent American cases invalidating commerce clause-invoking legislation do not call into question these 
well-established doctrines.   
  
Requirements Have Changed Since the Constitution Was Written 
Although some seek to confine the commerce power of the United States and Australia to what was 
intended by the Founding Fathers,77 the High Court is increasingly unconvinced by such arguments, 
most recently in the context of the corporations power.78  The joint reasons in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth dismiss the idea of pursing the intention of the founding fathers as ‘much more often 
than not, .. pursu(ing) a mirage’.79  Others have noted how nations have changed in the intervening 
years, meaning that interstate and overseas trade and commerce is much broader in scope than in the 
past, and the requirement to divide constitutional and non-constitutional commerce becomes more and 
more difficult to maintain.  Some of the original reason for doing so may have correspondingly 
disappeared.  As Sir Anthony Mason puts it 
 
At Federation, the States were separate communities with their own economies.  Interstate trade did not loom so large.  But 
now, with the advent of rapid transportation and communications and modern technology, trade within each State has been 
inextricably integrated with interstate and overseas trade.  As a result, the economic concept of interstate trade which might 
be distinguished in a meaningful way from local interstate trade at the turn of the century has necessarily expanded to 
embrace activities and transactions formerly having local significance only … What was within the contemplation of 
interstate trade in 1901 when the Australian economy was a series of loosely connected local or regional economies was a 
fairly small group of activities.  The reach of the Commonwealth’s power over trade and commerce was accordingly limited.  
                                                 
75 644-645 
76 659 
77 Justice Thomas in Lopez and Morrison; Raoul Berger ‘Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause’ (1996) 74 Texas 
Law Review 695; Johnathan O’Neill ‘Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism’ (2001) 96 Northwestern University 
Law Review 253; Randy Barnett ‘The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause’ (2001) 68 University of Chicago Law 
Review 101; ‘New Evidence of the Original Meaning of Commerce’ (2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 847; Richard Epstein 
‘The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 1387; ‘Constitutional Faith and the Commerce 
Clause’ (1996) 71 Notre Dame Law Review 167; cf H Jefferson Powell ‘The Original Understanding of Original Intent’ 
(1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 885 (stating the original Founding Fathers did not expect their intentions would influence 
subsequent interpretation of the Constitution) 
78 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 81 ALJR 34, para 145-147 
79 Para 127; the joint reasons add that it is not acceptable to decide the constitutionality of an Act by asking whether a 
common subjective intention can be attributed to the founding fathers.   
Since then, the logistical barriers between local economies have dissolved with the improvements in transportation and 
communication and these once separate economies have largely melded into one national economy80
 
As Windeyer J noted in Victoria v The Commonwealth 
 
The colonies which in 1901 became States in the new Commonwealth were not before then sovereign bodies in any strict 
legal sense; and certainly the Constitution did not make them so.  They were self-governing colonies which, when the 
Commonwealth came into existence as a new Dominion of the Crown, lost some of their former powers and gained no new 
powers.  They became components of a federation, the Commonwealth of Australia.  It became a nation.  Its nationhood was 
in the course of time to be consolidated at war, by economic and commercial integration, by the unifying influence of federal 
law, by the decline of dependence on British naval and military power and by a recognition and acceptance of external 
interests and obligations.  With these developments the position of the Commonwealth, the federal government, has waxed; 
and that of the States has waned.  In law, that is a result of the paramount position of the Commonwealth Parliament in 
matters of concurrent power.  And this legal supremacy has been reinforced in fact by financial dominance.  That the 
Commonwealth would, as time went on, enter progressively, directly or indirectly, into fields that had formerly been 
occupied by the States, was from an early date seen as likely to occur.81
 
Speaking of a broad reading of the commerce power, Professor Sawer says that 
 
If the result eventually is to leave the concept of intrastate trade almost empty, as it is now in the United 
States, this is merely the inevitable consequence of national economic integration.82  As Hueglin and 
Fenna, speaking of global federalism trends, put it recently83   
 
Changing circumstances have meant that the original intentions of founders of federations may not fit with a modern 
economy because the classic legislative federations were established in an altogether different era when the size and scope of 
government were limited, and it was relatively easy to divide responsibilities and to imagine two levels of government 
operating in their own spheres with little clash or overlap … The mixed economy, the welfare state, the rise of environmental 
policy, and the enormous increase in taxation have all greatly complicated policy making in a system of divided jurisdiction – 
as have the vastly greater mobility of labour, geographical scope of economic activity, and quality of communication and 
transportation 
 
These real world developments were also referred to in the dissenting opinion of Breyer J (with whom 
Stevens, Souter and Ginsbury JJ agreed) in United States v Morrison:84
                                                 
80 ‘The Australian Constitution 1901-1988’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 752; refer also to ‘Towards 2001 – 
Minimalism, Monarchism or Metamorphism’ (1995) 21 Monash Law Review 1, 11:  ‘with the advent of rapid transportation 
and communication, and the development of modern technology, trade within each State has become inextricably connected 
with interstate and overseas trade.  And the nationalisation of the economy has necessarily expanded the concept of interstate 
trade to embrace activities and transactions that formerly had local significance only.  These developments might conceivably 
justify a re-interpretation of the trade commerce power, the existing interpretation of which may be anchored in the artifices 
of legal formalism’.   
81 (Payroll Tax Case)(1971) 122 CLR 353; quoted with approval by Gleeson CJ Gummow Hayne Heydon and Crennan JJ in 
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) para 56 
82 Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) p206; refer also to Leslie Zines The High Court and the Constitution (1997) 
p79: ‘if the facts of social life so changed that an important area of activity or enterprise was seen to have a great and obvious 
impact upon a matter within federal control, it should .. be no answer to an argument in favour of Commonwealth power that 
it would deprive the States of exclusive law-making capacity in the field; David McCann ‘First Head Revisited: A Single 
Industrial Relations System Under the Trade and Commerce Power’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 75, 99-100: ‘Limiting the 
Commonwealth’s power to only interstate trade is a technical legal idea that is increasingly difficult to apply coherently to the 
facts.  Lines between intrastate and other trade are difficult to draw: exports and interstate trade are now heavily entwined 
with and affected by intrastate commerce … The Constitution can no longer live for horse shoes when everyone is driving 
Toyotas’; and the Business Council of Australia Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal-State 
Relations (2006) p1 ‘As the world globalises, barriers to the free movement of people, goods and services within Australia 
become increasingly anachronistic … The world has changed considerably since federation in 1901 .. Issues that were once 
clearly the responsibility of the States have taken on a more national character’.  
83 TO Hueglin and A Fenna Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (2006) p315 
84 (2000) 529 US 598.  Refer also to Richard Friedman ‘The Sometimes Bumpy Stream of Commerce Clause Doctrine’ 
(2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 981, 1006: ‘Before the Civil War, many Americans had greater allegiance to their state than 
to the nation, but that is true no longer.  Now the lines have expanded …Most Americans expect their national government to 
be a muscular one, capable of addressing problems of broad impact’; Robert Pushaw ‘Methods of Interpreting the Commerce 
Clause: A Comparative Analysis’ (2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 1185, 1210: ‘The United States has been transformed 
from predominantly self-sufficient households in agrarian communities (ie not engaged in interstate commerce) to an 
 
We live in a nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technical, commercial and environmental change.  Those 
changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its 
conditions, outside the State – at least when considered in the aggregate … And that fact makes it close to impossible for 
courts to develop meaningful subject matter categories that would exclude some kinds of local activities from ordinary 
Commerce Clause aggregation rules without, at the same time, depriving Congress of the power to regulate activities that 
have a genuine and important effect upon interstate commerce. 
 
The Bigger Picture – Federal/State Relations 
Of course, the debate over regulation of trade and commerce in Australia does not occur in a vacuum 
and is but one important part of a much broader problem.  There has been much debate recently about 
the future of Australia’s governance, and particularly the question of centralised versus regional control 
over particular responsibilities.  Ill-will between levels of government, lack of co-ordination and blurring 
of lines of responsibility are a hallmark of Australia’s federal system.  The Business Council of Australia 
was not exaggerating when it said recently that 
 
The lines of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and States have become chronically blurred and confused.  We have 
a system in which, because of a growing lack of transparency and accountability, the quantity of government has taken 
precedence over quality85
 
Access Economics conservatively estimated that weaknesses and inefficiencies in Australia’s federal 
structure cost $9 billion per year,86 and noted some estimates that it was $20 billion per year.87  Some of 
the irregularities in Australia’s system of business regulation noted by the Business Council included: 
 
(a) eight occupational health and safety systems; 
(b) eight sets of environmental approvals; 
(c) eight sets of building product manufacturing requirements, compliance with which said to cost 
between 1 and 5% of a building company’s turnover each year; 
(d) food standards set by State Governments; 
(e) transport regulations in relation to rail and road being set by States; 
(f) restrictions on the ability of a person licensed to work in one state working in another due to 
different training requirements88 
(g) onerous regulation on those who wish to proceed with mining.89 
 
Fitzgerald has noted the inefficiencies in Australia’s health system caused by blurring of responsibilities 
and cost shifting between levels of government: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
integrated national economy based on commercial agriculture, manufacturing and service.  And Congress and the Court 
cannot help but respond to such changes’.  
85 Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal-State Relations (2006) iv 
86 The $9 billion is comprised of: 
$861 million for overlap and duplication due to the need to administer grants between jurisdictions 
$836 million for cost shifting by the States that results in inefficient Commonwealth spending 
$2296 million spending above efficient levels by the States due to lack of co-ordination and/or inadequacies in 
Commonwealth oversight and accountabilities 
$913 million in areas where both the State and Federal Government are operating at the same time 
$215 million inefficiencies from horizontal fiscal equalisation (redirecting cash from more successful states to less financially 
successful states) 
$2782 million in inefficient state taxation 
$866 million efficiency (deadweight) costs of raising taxes to pay for higher than necessary spending levels 
$150 million failure to centralise tax collection of payroll and gambling taxes 
87 Vii; The Costs of Federalism (2006), Report by Access Economics Pty Ltd for the Business Council of Australia 
88 Reshaping Australia’s Federation, Business Council of Australia p10-12; these areas, as well as chemicals and plastics, 
business regulation processes, personal property securities and product safety, were also identified by the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in their Communique 10/2/06 as being areas where overlapping and inconsistent regulatory 
regimes are impeding economic activity. 
89 In a survey, the Minerals Council of Australia asked respondents the impact of regulatory duplication and inconsistencies 
on their investment.  The percentage of those who responded negatively, including mildly deterred to decided not to pursue 
investment, was 51% in Victoria, 43% in New South Wales, 41% in Queensland, 34% in Western Australia, 32% in South 
Australia, and 10% in Tasmania: Taskforce on Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Business (2006) 
 
The two major levels of government share the responsibility to ensure health expenditure is adequate, equitable and cost 
effective.  The complex split in responsibilities for funding and provision of health care leads to poor co-ordination of 
planning and service delivery, barriers to effective substitution of alternative types and sources of care, and scope for cost 
shifting.  The funding arrangements do not encourage continuity of care, provision of multidisciplinary care, or provision of 
care in the most clinically appropriate setting.  There is a lack of focus on prevention, health promotion and disease 
management.90
 
Of course, the issue of which level of government is responsible for what in a federation is related to 
another issue, the question of which level has the ability to raise the revenue required.  In the author’s 
view, the issue of which level of government should be responsible for which functions must be 
addressed first, with discussion of revenue raising responsibilities to follow after the fact.  The extent of 
vertical fiscal imbalance in Australia, whereby there is a mismatch between levels of responsibility and 
ability to raise revenue, is well documented and requires little elaboration here.  In 2005-2006, States 
raised $43 billion in taxation revenue, but had total expenditure of $166 billion.91  The GST pays for 
about 25% of States’ spending; States remain very reliant on grants from the Commonwealth in order to 
conduct their activities.  Despite all GST revenues (which are growing sharply)92 going to the States 
pursuant to the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial 
Relations, specific purpose grants to the States under s96 remain substantial, with payments either to or 
through the States expected to total almost $27 billion in the 2006-2007 year, an increase from about 
$25.5 billion in the 2005-2006 year.93
 
The system of grants is not, however, without its difficulties.  The availability of grants can cause goods 
and services to be underpriced, leading to an excess in supply.94  Further, they create the possibility of 
competitive bidding over the distribution of grants, with resources wasted in the bidding process and the 
prospect of politically rather than economically motivated outcomes.95  It is claimed that because they 
can rely on Commonwealth grants for funding, States may have little incentive to exercise financial 
restraint.  Alternatively, it is claimed they are required to account in excessive detail for the funds 
spent.96  Access Economics claimed recently that some conditions attached to grants do not focus 
appropriately on outcomes.97  It is claimed that States become expert at ‘gaming’ grants, where their 
contribution to what is intended to be a jointly-funded program may be hard to discern.  There was a 
lack of administrative transparency in some specific purpose payment schemes.98
 
It is said then that a more functional federal system might align responsibilities and spending more 
directly.  The Federal Government has been forced to use circuitous means to regulate areas, including 
those which some might consider broadly to be within the church of ‘trade and commerce’, over which 
                                                 
90 Fitzgerald, V (2006) Health Reform in the Federal Context, in Productive Reform in a Federal System, Roundtable 
Proceedings, Productivity Commission Canberra 
91 ABS: Government Finance Statistics, 2005-2006, Cat No 5512.0 
92 States received an estimated $64.6 billion in 2005-2006, and $67.5 billion in 2006-2007: Budget Paper No 3, 2006, 
Commonwealth-State Financial Relations 
93 Budget Paper No 3, 2006, Commonwealth-State Financial Relations 
94 See Walsh, C ‘Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: The Issues’ in Collins, D J ed Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and the Allocation of 
Taxing Power, Australian Tax Research Foundation Conference Series No 13 (1993) p43.  Some refer to this as the flypaper 
effect of grants:  Dollery, B E and Worthington, A C ‘Federal Expenditure and Fiscal Illusion:  A Test of the Flypaper 
Hypothesis in Australia (1995) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 25; and Grossman, P J ‘The Impact of Federal and State 
Grants on Local Government Spending: A Test of the Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis’ (1990) 18 Public Finance Quarterly 313 
95 Walsh, C ‘An Economic Perspective’ in Brian Galligan ed Australian Federalism (1989) p224, and Fiscal Equalisation, 
Allocative Efficiency and State Business Undertakings: The Commonwealth Grants Commission 1988 Report on Relativities 
(1988) p8, and Brown, H P ‘Some Aspects of Federal-State Financial Relations’ in Prest, W and Mathews, R L ed The 
Development of Australian Fiscal Federalism (1980) p452 
96 Harris, C P Relationships Between Federal and State Governments in Australia (1979) Advisory Council for Inter-
Governmental Relations Info Paper No 6 p72 
97 The Costs of Federalism (2006) p33.  It examined the Commonwealth/State Agreement on Skilling Australia’s Workforce, 
noting the funding provides perverse incentives and excessive presciptiveness from the Commonwealth.  The agreement does 
not provide incentives for improving training quality, rewards States for inefficiency and imposes prescriptive requirements 
with no link to training outcomes. 
98 The Costs of Federalism (2006) p36 
there is an expectation of national and consistent standards.  Were the High Court to adopt a broader 
view of s51(1), the need for the Commonwealth to rely on such circuitous means would be lessened. 
 
Consequences of a Broader Interpretation of the s51(1) Power 
Let us examine now the consequences for the Commonwealth and for Australia if the High Court were 
to embrace the commerce clause jurisprudence in the United States.  In particular, we will examine the 
consequences that would follow if we in Australia embraced the now longstanding American doctrine 
that the Federal Government can regulate things or activities that affect constitutional commerce.  I will 
discuss below some possible future areas for the Commonwealth’s reach.  Implicit in this discussion is 
the belief that the recent broader reach given to the Commonwealth under its corporations power is not 
sufficient of itself to allow the Commonwealth to regulate matters that ought to be nationally run.  The 
Commonwealth currently provides specific purpose grants to the States in each of the areas mentioned 
below.99
 
(a) Control Over Transportation 
As I have indicated, strong concern has recently been expressed by the Business Council of Australia 
about Australia’s hotch-potch and inconsistent transport regulation, particular affecting rail and road 
transport.  The Council found that 
 
An operator of an interstate train in Australia may have to deal with six access regulators, seven rail safety inspectors with 
nine different pieces of legislation, three transport accident investigators, 15 pieces of legislation covering occupational health 
and safety rail operations, and 75 pieces of legislation with powers over environmental management.  Australia has seven rail 
safety regulators for a population of around 20 million people.  In contrast, the United States, with a population of 300 
million people, has one rail safety regulator100
 
There is still no consistency, for example, between Victoria and New South Wales, on maximum load capacities.  Even in 
2006, a truck travelling up the Hume Highway may comply with the maximum load requirements as it passes through 
Wodonga, but be in breach once if reaches Albury101
 
As Treasury Secretary Dr Ken Henry found 
 
A particularly farcical example of rail services fragmentation is in train communications.  Currently, each State and Territory 
requires trains within its jurisdictions to have a particular type of radio – for good measure, New South Wales mandates two – 
meaning that a train cannot operate nationally without eight different radio systems.  And even with a cabin full of eight 
radios, trains cannot talk to each other102
 
Rail safety regulation is one of the 10 priority cross-jurisdictional hotspot areas identified by COAG as 
being where overlapping and inconsistent regulatory regimes are impeding economic activity.   
 
In the area of air safety, of course already the High Court has recognised that given the physical 
integration of constitutional and non-constitutional air travel, the Commonwealth must be able to 
regulate both.103
 
It is submitted that by analogy the Commonwealth should be found to have the power to issue national 
rail safety regulations, control access to railways, and be able to introduce national road transport 
regulations to overcome the inefficiencies of business having to comply with a large number of different 
sets of rules.  Of course, Congress has been able to use the commerce clause to regulate aspects of 
transport, most notably in Gibbons v Ogden, the Shreveport Rate Case, The Daniel Ball, and in Garcia v 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.  The author agrees with Regan that  
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The existence of efficient networks for interstate transportation and communication is one of the general interests of the 
union, perhaps the most obvious and pre-eminent internal general interest of the union.  Efficient interstate transportation and 
communication is essential to our being a union.  Without effective means for the interchange of ideas, people and goods, the 
people of the various states could hardly have come to consider themselves a single nation.  Free interchange continues to be 
essential for a feeling of national solidarity … Standards for the safety and financial health of instrumentalities that operate 
physically in many states are likely to require harmonised and therefore central regulation104
 
Given that the desire to promote intercolonial trade was one of the two main reasons for Australia 
becoming a federal system,105 as important a factor as the creation of the United States, it seems 
incongruous that barriers to interstate trade such as different rail and road safety systems should continue 
to exist.  Let the Commonwealth Government be recognised as having the power under s51(1) to 
introduce a national approach. 
 
(b) Environmental and Land Regulation 
Of course, the Federal Government lacks direct constitutional power over environmental matters.  It has 
been able to partly regulate the environment through the external affairs power106 and, to a very limited 
degree involving the banning of a product for export, through the trade and commerce power.107  
Environmental assessment and approvals processes were one of the 10 cross-jurisdictional hotspots 
identified by COAG where ‘overlapping and inconsistent regulatory regimes were impeding economic 
activity’.108  Global warming requires a national rather than local response.109  Recently, the Federal 
Government has proposed a takeover of regulation of the Murray-Darling basin, given the very serious 
drought facing many parts of Australia, and the misuse of Australia’s water resources in the past.  Could 
the Federal Government, in the name of its trade and commerce power, be seen to have general power 
over environmental matters? 
 
Some feel that this would be eminently sensible.  As Dr Ken Henry from Treasury noted 
 
We do not have a national water market.  In fact, we do not even have functioning State water markets.  Instead, the majority 
of trade in water occurs within catchments and even then in insignificant volumes .. water still cannot be traded interstate 
beyond a limited pilot area … water is rarely traded between competing uses, being more likely to be traded between 
producers of similar commodities … The National Water Initiative (NWI), agreed by COAG in June 2004, sets out to 
establish a property rights framework for water and to create a national water market.  The obstacles are considerable.  For 
example, States have different water entitlement regimes, which create a practical barrier to the development of a national 
market.  These barriers have proved difficult to overcome.  But unless and until they are, NWI benchmarks will not be met.110
 
Access Economics, commenting on Australia’s shrinking share of global mineral exploration, concludes 
that 
 
In part that is because our federal system makes digging holes rather more complex than it need be.  In Australia, State and 
local governments allocate mineral resources and ensure a return to the public from their utilisation.  But land access for 
Crown land and private land, heritage issues, uranium exploration, mining and export licensing, competition policy, taxes and 
foreign investment approvals are regulated by both the Commonwealth and the States.  This sharing of powers creates 
confusion, duplication and waster if the requirements set by one Government are different from those set by another – as they 
all too often are111
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Certainly, there is commerce clause precedent to support such a move.  In the Hodel cases,112 Congress 
was permitted under the commerce clause to apply limits on strip mining, and provide for the restoration 
of ‘steep slopes’ and ‘prime farmland’.  This land was not directly part of constitutional commerce; 
however the court found that is was reasonable for Congress to act on the basis that certain productive 
activities substantially affected interstate commerce, and were for that reason regulable by the Federal 
Government.  This is defensible policy on the basis that 
 
Threats to air and water quality are no respecters of state lines … individual states are to some extent flatly incapable of 
adequately regulating their own environments by their own efforts … Environmental regulation also requires extensive 
scientific expertise which is (another reason for federal control) … States may be reluctant to impose costly environmental 
regulation on local businesses, for fear of handicapping them in interstate competition113  
 
The Court recently validated the Clean Air Act as it applied to a person renovating an old hospital.114  
The renovations had uncovered asbestos in the building.  The Court concluded the Act could regulate the 
disposal of the asbestos, reasoning that asbestos removal was a booming industry, that most asbestos 
removal had a commercial purpose, there was a national market for asbestos removal, and the nexus 
between that market and interstate commerce was not attenuated, but direct and apparent.115  Further, 
clean up orders on contaminated sites were valid, because otherwise permitting a chemical plant to 
dispose of its waste in a unregulated way could give it a market advantage over companies that lacked 
this option, thus affecting interstate commerce.116  Congress can even act to secure a threatened species, 
because failure to act could deprive commercial actors of ‘biodiversity’.117
 
Thus there is conceptual justification for thinking that laws affecting the environment need to be 
national, and the American jurisprudence supports the ability of the Federal Government to regulate 
such matters under the rubric of commerce. 
 
(c) Employment Matters 
While the Federal Government can regulate at least the working conditions of those who work for 
corporations,118 perhaps the trade and commerce power could be used to regulate all employment issues, 
regardless of the form of the employer.  There continues to be State-based occupational health and safety 
regulation, also on the COAG list of troublesome regulatory regimes impeding economic activity.  The 
Business Council also seeks a national approach to workers’ compensation, equal opportunity and anti-
discrimination,119 currently regulated at the State level. 
 
McCann, writing before the Federal Government’s WorkChoices legislation, argued in favour of a 
Commonwealth takeover of industrial relations through s51(1): 
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(Section 51(1)) provides an effective) … way for the Commonwealth to implement a system that covers both a wide range of 
workplace issues … and a large percentage of Australian workers … (the system is)  conceptually, legally and procedurally 
complicated and costly120
 
Of course, several of the United States commerce clause cases have involved employment matters, 
including NLRB v Jones and Laughlin, United States v Darby, Katzenback v McClung, and Heart of 
Atlanta Motel Inc v United States. 
 
A related issue is the requirements to work in particular occupations.  These are again primarily state-
based, creating numerous anomalies.  This is also on COAG’s list of the 10 worse regulatory 
impediments to economic activity.  As the Business Council highlights, the fact a person is licensed to 
work as an electrician in one state does not mean they can necessarily work in another, because the word 
‘electrician’ means different things in different states, with different categories and number of categories 
across states.  A person with a certificate in hairdressing has a nationally recognised qualification, but is 
not necessarily able to work in all states, since each state has its own requirements in terms of work 
experience and other matters.121  There are currently 149 occupational licences in New South Wales, 
136 in Victoria, 87 in Western Australia, 69 in the ACT and 47 at the Commonwealth level.122  Access 
Economics is again dismissive 
 
The States often stop the right person being in the right job – or, at least, make them go through duplicated regulatory hoops 
to do in one State something they have already qualified to practice in another State .. All too often, someone licensed in one 
State cannot readily practice in another.  That is typically a triumph of bureaucracy over common sense.123
 
The argument that is that the Commonwealth should be responsible for all licensing of those engaged in 
trades and professions.  This would avoid the difficulties inherent in the current system whereby, despite 
some tentative moves in some fields, professional and trade qualifications in one state may not be 
recognised in others.  State-based licensing of trades and professions operates as a barrier to interstate 
trade and commerce, and to the movement of people in Australia.  Though perhaps challengeable under 
s92,124 it should not be countenanced. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent reports have, with justification, called into question the continuing efficacy of Australia’s current 
federal arrangements.  Given the difficulty of securing and paucity of successful amendments to the 
Constitution, the Federal Government has worked around the constraints on its commerce power 
primarily by using financial inducements to achieve what it wants in particular areas, including in areas 
that most people would say require a national rather than piecemeal approach.  The efficiency of this is 
open to question.  Society has changed and there is a need for increased national regulation over many 
aspects of commercial activity, and the lines between constitutional and non-constitutional trade and 
commerce have become almost entirely blurred.  Of all statutes, the Constitution is the one that must 
adapt to changes in the requirements of society.  The High Court should for these reasons broaden its 
existing narrow interpretation of the commerce power, drawing support for that step from the experience 
of its American counterpart.  Lines of accountability and responsibility will as a result be clearer in 
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